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ABSTRACT
The development of artificial general intelligence is considered by many to be inevitable. What such intelligence
does after becoming aware is not so certain. To that end, research suggests that the likelihood of artificial
general intelligence becoming hostile to humans is significant enough to warrant inquiry into methods to limit such
potential. Thus, containment of artificial general intelligence is a timely and meaningful research topic. While
there is limited research exploring possible containment strategies, such work is bounded by the underlying field
the strategies draw upon. Accordingly, we set out to construct an ontology to describe necessary elements in
any future containment technology. Using existing academic literature, we developed a single domain ontology
containing five levels, 32 codes, and 32 associated descriptors. Further, we constructed ontology diagrams to
demonstrate intended relationships. We then identified humans, AGI, and the cyber world as novel agent objects
necessary for future containment activities. Collectively, the work addresses three critical gaps: (a) identifying and
arranging fundamental constructs; (b) situating AGI containment within cyber science; and (c) developing scientific
rigor within the field.
1. Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a timely and germane topic. No longer the esoteric domain of academics and researchers
alone, the public is well aware of the extensive progress in the field. Mainstream media has brought practical
applications such as autonomous vehicles (e.g. Tesla) and leisure game victories (e.g., Waston, AlphaGo) to the
forefront of daily life. Thinking machines are a realization of science fiction, writ large. Certainly, the positive
aspects of continuing to develop and deploy such systems are disruptive (Sotala & Yampolskiy, 2016). However,
such narrow AI operates in limited operational scope and presents little direct risk to human life. On the other hand,
a synthetic intelligence with the ability to dynamically operate in general scopes may indeed present direct and
sustained danger.
Artificial general intelligence (AGI) is precisely that; AI with intelligence at or beyond human capability. While
the concept of AGI is not new, there has been rapid growth in the literature surrounding the subject. AGI, perhaps
unfortunately, is framed broadly in two manners: (a) in popular culture, as something that is simultaneously inevitable
(Amodei et al., 2016; Baum, Goertzel, & Goertzel, 2011; Kurzweil 2005) and (b) of existential danger (Bostrom,
2002; Bostrom & Yudkowsky, 2011; Bostrom & Cirkovic, 2011). The nexus of these two frames has engendered
serious research into ethics and transhumanism, as well as safety and trust.
This study focuses on a specific area of research in the latter category: containment of AGI. According to Babcock,
Kramar, & Yampolskiy (2016), viable AGI containment will necessitate a combination of traditional cybersecurity
technologies such as (a) safe language semantics; (b) physical separation of systems; (c) sandboxing; and (d) virtual-
ization. However, Babcock et al. recognized the problem of limited capacity for traditional cybersecurity paradigms
to address AGI containment. That is, the technologies Babcock et al. suggested may present a small window into
what the broader field of cyber science can offer to future containment research and practical development.
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Cyber science is a nascent field that considers cybersecurity in a more comprehensive knowledge context (Ma, Nahal,
& Tran, 2015; Maxion, Longstaff, & McHugh, 2010; McDaniel, Rivera, & Swami, 2014). An applicable sector
within the cyber science was defined by Kott (2015) as principally considering malicious software. The applicability
rests in the nuance of Kott’s argument; that is, ”malicious software (as well as legitimate software and protocols used
maliciously) used to compel a computing device or a network of computing devices to perform actions desired by
the perpetrator of malicious software (the attacker) and generally contrary to the intent (the policy) of the legitimate
owner or operator (the defender) of the computing device(s)” (pg. 1). While there could be debate as to whether an
AGI is malicious software (in the perspective of humans) or a containment apparatus is malicious software (in the
perspective of the AGI), there is not a means to organize the underlying constructs that engender meaning.
Thus, we endeavored to build upon the initial discussion initiated by Babcock et al. (2016) by developing a cyber
science focused ontology for AGI containment. The significance in doing so rests in the necessity of having a
formalized, systematic abstraction from which future research can construct scientific inquiry. Moreover, such an
ontology may fill existing gaps in a manner that enables future applied research in AGI containment.
2. Background
Scientists have sought to engineer AI with intelligence at or beyond human capability by aggregating existing
narrow AI technology. Narrow AI is an implementation tool for enhancing human tasks in limited domains (Stone et
al., 2016). The problem is that narrow AI cannot be aggregated to birth general AI (Baillie, 2016). Accordingly,
the purview has transitioned from manufacturing singular intelligent parts to conceiving entire intuitive systems.
Such systems have instigated innovations in novel training approaches (Guo & Aarabi, 2016), learned systems for
internal efficiency (Le & Schuster, 2016), greater contextual and environmental awareness (Denil et al., 2017), and
emergence (Silver et al., 2016). Progress has been further accelerated by advancements in big data, machine learning,
and computer processing (Stone et al., 2016).
The result is not only a catalogue of technologies capable of functioning appropriately with environmental foresight
(Nilsson, 2009) but an entirely new cyber science. While, artificial general intelligence portends the ability of an
intelligent machine to infer, reason, and adapt to its environment, cyber science contextualizes such AGI within a
more comprehensive knowledge framework (Kott, 2015). Cyber science contrasts existing literature that rationalizes
AGI solely within the physical world of humans (Bostrom, 2002; Bostrom & Yudkowsky, 2011; Amodei et al.,
2016). Instead, cyber science trains the lens of AGI investigation on the complex and unpredictable cyber world a
future entity may exist in (Oltramari, Cranor, Walls, & McDaniel, 2014; Ma et al., 2015; McDaniel et al., 2014).
Accordingly, actuating AGI is constrained by the implications of unpredictability (Agar, 2016; Stone et al. 2016).
In fact, an entire subfield is dedicated to mitigating potential AGI through containment (Babcock, Kramar, &
Yampolskiy, 2017).
Containment seeks to avert scenarios where AI maliciously competes against humans through strict regulation and
control (Bostrom, 2014; Babcock et al., 2016). Conditions include not only technical protocols but ethical, moral,
and legal considerations as well (Yampolskiy, 2012; Powers, 2006; Lewis & Modirzadeh, 2016). Such controls are
predicated on the assumption that AGI not only possesses a catastrophic, even existential, risk to human society but
that it will act on such risk by intentionally harming humans (Mu¨ller, 2014; Bostrom, 2014; Sotala & Yampolskiy,
2014; Chalmers, Awret, & Appleyard, 2016; Amodei et al., 2016; Yudkowsky, 2008). Accordingly, containment
literature demonstrates a singular preference toward delaying or banning AI advancements altogether to achieve a
zerosum, human favored reality (Babcock, et al., 2017). Yet, existing containment literature is plagued by myriad
definitions and paradigms, an assimilation of danger through an anthropomorphic lens, and a focus on avoidance
that assumes a negative position of inevitability (Bishop, 2009; Grau, 2006; Yampolskiy & Fox, 2012). Thus,
implementation of containment policies is not only inherently obtuse but contradictory to the entire premise of
superintelligence.
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Agar (2016) challenged containment assumptions by arguing that solutions to the AGI problem are as conceivable as
AGI itself. In fact, human society will become increasingly more adept at handling AGI as continued artificially
intelligent innovations become common place (Agar, 2016; Stone et al. 2016). That is, Agar and Stone assert that
if humans can develop a superintelligent machine, then we are equally as capable of harnessing such technology
to solve any subsequent issues that arise from it. Developing an architecture that accurately accounts for such an
assertion requires containment be mapped to the greater cyber theoretical framework (Ning, et al., 2017). Such an
architecture is the crux of cyber science, which supplements technical and physical premises with philosophical and
social ones (Maxion et al., 2010; Oltramari et al., 2014; Ning, 2016).
Yet, while an ontological architecture for AGI containment been suggested (Yampolskiy & Fox, 2012; Yampolskiy,
2014, 2016), one has never been fully codified (Amodei et al., 2016). As a result, the cyber community lacks a
measurable or repeatable standard from which to understand or predict cyber events and entities (Maxion et al., 2010).
An ontology for AGI containment therefore, accounts for the broader cyber context by systematically converting
existing AGI abstractions into defined relationships (Kott, 2015). In doing so, our cyber sciencefocused ontology for
AGI observes domain constructs, remains iterative, and applies a level of scientific rigor currently underdeveloped
within the discipline (Uschold & King, 1995; Ren, 2012; Maxion et al., 2010). Simultaneously, our analysis will
leverage the same multidisciplinary approaches compulsory in AGI development to its germinal research. The
resulting ontology may establish AGI as a cyber science domain and enable future empirical research.
3. Method
A single research question motivated this study: what specific concepts and relationships between such concepts are
necessary so that AGI containment functionality can be explored? Toward an answer to this research question, we
endeavored to develop a cyber science focused ontology for AGI containment. Development of an ontology appeared
appropriate because, as Babcock et al. (2016, 2017) commented, there is uncertainty as to how AGI containment
ought to function. Further, as a scientific field defined by both theoretical and empirical methods, exploring cyber
science relationships requires a foundational ontology (Longstaff, 2010). In other words, an ontology can mitigate
conceptual misunderstanding.
Poli (1996) suggested that ontologies provide generalized frameworks in which more specific knowledge taxonomies
can be developed. Further, as Poli noted, the unavailability of an ontology limits the relational context for future
inferences or knowledge construction. Indeed, the lack of an ontology inhibits meaningful discourse not only
concerning concepts but also with applied constructs. Accordingly, we suspected that a lack of foundational ontology
might be a cause for the uncertainty related to AGI containment described by Backcock et al (2016, 2017). Thus, to
formally represent the concepts that ought to be included in AGI containment, we pursued a single domain ontology
(Subhashini & Akilandeswari, 2011).
3.1 Method Appropriateness
We considered a grounded theory design for our research methodology. Grounded theory is appropriate when one
seeks to develop a theory based on emergent themes in data (Martin & Turner, 1986). That is, grounded theory
produces an explanation of what is given existing qualitative data. Such an explanation is achieved by iteratively
collecting and analyzing data. However, according to Suddaby (2006), the results from grounded theory research are
limited by what is known. Thus, while there may be some notional overlap between grounded theory and ontology,
the former presupposes the latter. As well, we did not set out to facilitate the output of theory as much as the
underlying conceptual vocabulary to support future theoretical frameworks.
Existing research (Subhashini & Akilandeswari, 2011; Swartout, Patil, Knight, & Russ, 1997) outlined two toplevel
forms of ontology: domain and theory. Domain ontologies are classlevel vocabularies that express concepts and
relationships between those concepts (Swartout et al., 1997). In contrast, Swartout et al. defined theory ontologies as
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describing aspects of (our) reality. While a theory ontology could be used, we decided that the reality of an AGI
in a containment space would be best described by that AGI. Whereas, we felt developing concepts related to the
containment space itself to be a rational position.
Additionally, we elected to develop a single domain ontology as opposed to a multiple domain ontology or a
hybrid ontology. Relevant literature (Subhashini & Akilandeswari, 2011; Swartout, Patil, Knight, & Russ, 1997)
indicated that a single ontology best establishes a global ontology based on the collection of concept sources.
The single ontology approach appeared most fitting relative to our purpose of developing a universal ontology for
AGI containment. In contrast, a multiple ontology or hybrid ontology approach did not align with our objective
due to those methodologies necessitating the development of local ontologies mapped individually to the source
material.
3.2 Existing Ontologies
Before developing our ontology, we performed a literature review to ensure that no ontology existed which addressed
our research question. This literature search was distinct from that performed later as a means of collecting literature
for the development of the AGI containment ontology proposed in this work. While a rich knowledge base exists for
narrow aspects of artificial intelligence (e.g., natural language processing), we did not find any ontologyrelated AGI
containment literature. The lack of such research was not surprising given the nascent form of the AGI containment
field and does not reflect negatively on the existing work on the topic. Next, we searched for germane literature
associated with cyber science and cybersecurity.
Interestingly, both cyber science and cybersecurity offered foundational ontologies albeit without any direct relevance
to AI, AGI, or AGI containment. Moreover, according to Oltramari, Cranor, Walls, and McDaniel (2014), existing
cybersecurity ontologies (Blanco et al., 2008) are flawed. Further, attempts to achieve a robust cyber science
ontology have fallen short (Maxion et al., 2010; Ning, 2017). Although this study does not address the limitations
of cyber science or cybersecurity ontologies, we did ensure that such were not carried forward into our proposed
ontology.
3.3 Ontology Construction Methodology
Two studies directly informed how we developed our ontology. Foremost, we consulted the seminal work by Uschold
and King (1995) for a general sketch of what phases we should follow when constructing a new ontology. Further,
to minimize potential errors while determining fundamental AGI containment concepts, we leveraged the ontology
building process outlined by Ren (2012). Ren suggested that the use of academic literature as the foundational
source of concepts presented a more reliable and efficient ontology building process. Not only did literature as
a material concept source present a sound rationale for this work but such also conformed to our stated purpose
through enabling the single domain methodology.
Furthermore, our ontology construction process focused on the designing and development steps as described by
Subhashini and Akilandeswari (2011). Integrating the new ontology with existing ontologies was not necessary
for obvious reasons. Additionally, given the germinal nature of this work, we opted to postpone refinement of the
proposed ontology through validation and iteration. Subordinate to the design and develop steps, we employed the
specific construction phases outlined by Ren (2012). That is, we (a) collected academic literature associated with
AGI containment, (b) selected potential ontology concepts based on keywords in the literature, and (c) extracted
relationships between such potential concepts based on keyword frequencies. The relationships between concepts
were mapped using two graph morphologies.
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4. Results
We opted for a modular, tiered ontology architecture comprised of objects, attributes, and relationships (Oltramari et
al., 2014; Subhashini & Akilandeswari, 2011; Ren, 2012). Concurrently, an axiomatic approach created a foundation
from which our ontology could extract further reason around said objects, attributes, and relationships. Axioms are
stated along with the ontology element they describe. The structure of our ontology is detailed as follows.
4.1 Objects
Objects (Table 1) in our cyber science ontology for AGI containment represent upper domain areas. As an upper
domain area, objects are agents through which AGI containment occurs. Thus, without such agents, containment
could not occur. Furthermore, agents can be understood as entities, of which there are three types: humans, AGI, and
the cyber world. The three agents are discrete, meaning that a human cannot be AGI cannot be a cyber world.
Object Coding O1 O2 O3
Object Descriptor human AGI cyberworld
Table 1. Tiered ontology description of levels, codes, and descriptors for Objects
Humans are an organic agent capable of autonomy and intelligence whereas AGI are an artificial agent capable
of autonomy and intelligence. Indeed, the capacity for autonomy and intelligence is fundamental to containment
because without such features, agents would have no need, desire, or intent. Thus, the final agent of containment is
the cyber world, which is the digitized environment in which organic human and artificial general intelligence agents
exist (Ma et al., 2015). That is, containment can only exist in the cyber world, and never occurs in a conventional,
noncyber enabled world.
Class Coding C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
Class Descriptor individual society swarm physical social mental cyber
Table 2. Tiered ontology description of levels, codes, and descriptors for Classes
Agents are concentrated based on their instance and class (Table 2): a single human or AGI instance is an individual,
while a class of humans is a society and a class of AGI is a swarm. Similarly, the cyber world is composed of four
class concepts: the cyber, physical, social, and mental (CPSM) (Ning, 2017). Instance and class serve to further
subcategorize and delimit agent relationships. For example, a distinction is drawn between each cyber world class
since humans and AGI are not required to exist in all four simultaneously. Each instance and class also exhibit and
maintains their own features. Specifically, the cyber realm is ”anything that exists digitally in cyberspace, either
purely synthesized by a computer, or closely correlated to and further conjugated with a real entity in physical,
social and mental spaces” (Ma et al., 2015). Meanwhile, the physical, social, and mental space mimic those of
conventional worlds but are understood from a cyber science perspective as conjugations of objects. In this case,
subcategorization arranges the ontology hierarchically (Figure 1) to more easily segregate objects.
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Figure 1. Diagram of agent objects (O), their classes(C) in the AGI containment ontology.
4.2 Attributes
Another form of segregation occurs through physical and abstract attributes (Table 3). Physical attributes provide the
infrastructure from which agents compose and leverage capabilities. Thus, physical attributes enable delineation by
creating a unique signature summarized by the composition, architecture, and locality of the agent.
Atrribute Coding A1 A2
Atrribute Descriptor physical abstract
Table 3. Tiered ontology description of levels, codes, and descriptors for Attributes
The object’s signature separates one agent from another. For example, the nature of the agent (composition) and the
structure of the agent (architecture) couple with locality to output a unique persona that marks an agent in space
and time. Subcategorization in this sense serves to further distinguish an entity by creating a discrete identity. For
instance, composition is the construction of matter (organic or inorganic) and visibility (able to be seen or not).
Similarly, physical architecture categorizes the agent based on their hardware (the physical tools, implements, and
parts used by entities) and software (the programs, libraries, and data used by entities for executing relationships).
With locality providing a temporal and spatial reference point, physical attributes enable cyber science agent
differentiation through unique traits (Figure 2).
In addition to physical attributes, objects within the cyber science interpretation of AGI containment can be
containerized by abstract attributes (Figure 3). In fact, while physical attributes ascribe identity, abstract attributes
account for the concepts that predicate a containment environment. Thus, abstract attributes are the capabilities
leveraged by objects in a cyber science world. Capabilities come in the form of security, intelligence, and autonomy.
Regarding autonomy and intelligence, there are two axioms. There are no degrees of autonomy; an agent is
autonomous or it is not. Additionally, intelligence is a physical process or the (emergent) consequence of one; not a
metaphysical process or the (emergent) consequence of one (Wissner-Gross & Freer, 2013).
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Figure 2. Diagram of physical attributes (A1), subattributes (S), and their features (F) in the AGI containment
ontology.
Further, security is a phenomenon that exists within spectrums of logic and uncertainty, where logic is the essence of
rules applied to cyber science objects and uncertainty is the unpredictability of cyber science objects (Kott, 2015).
Conversely, intelligence and autonomy are dictated by binary properties, with intelligence being the capacity to
acquire knowledge and skills and autonomy being the capacity to exercise independent control over one’s own
intelligence. Such binary properties serve to create discrete features. For example, there is no spectrum of quality
or composition; the quality can only be narrow or general and the composition can only be artificial or organic
(made by chemical synthesis) or artificial (not existing naturally). Such discrete features compliment degree-based
properties to create a ho-listic abstraction of the agent.
Figure 3. Diagram of abstract attributes (A2), subattributes (S), and their features (F) in the AGI containment
ontology.
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4.3 Relationships
With defined agents and such agent identities, relationships serve to outline interaction between objects within the
context of containment. The relationships described in our cyber science ontology (Figure 4) are either active or
passive. Passive relationships enable the environment and consistent of existence (having objective reality) and
policy (a set of assertions or requirements) (Kott, 2015). Without existence or policy, containment is an irrelevant
non-factor. Yet, converting containment the concept into containment the executable requires that active relationships
be applied to the cyber science world. Thus, the intent of active relationships is to either attack or defend.
The dynamics of attack or defend relationships are such that all relationships occur within a cyber world; and active
relationships occur only after passive ones. That is, agents must be in existence and policy must be violated for
attack or defend activities to occur. Thus, relationships exhibit a sequential pattern: passive relationships occur;
the cyber world is disturbed; the attacker employs tools or techniques to promote activity adverse to the intent
of the defender; and the defender employs tools or techniques to re-initiate or establish their intent (Kott, 2015).
Containment, therefore, can be described as an active relationship between agents, and within a cyber world, that (a)
prevents an agent from disrupting the cyber world without authorization or (b) maintains the equilibrium achieved
during active relationships (Babcock et al., 2016).
Figure 4. Diagram of relationships (R), subattributes (S), and features (F) in the ontology for AGI containment.
Given the function of containment f(c) and current knowledge of the cyber world k, both attacker and defender
exist in a f(c) = k environment. However, an attack implies that the attacker has acted on k. Thus, the attack can
be described as f(c) = k+1, where +1 is the subsequent action of the attacker in response to k. Thus, an attack has
two features: initiation and intent. Initiation describes the agent acting on k (human or AGI) while intent represents
the catalyst for initiation (k). Intent therefore, is either preemptive or responsive, where preemptive is to prevent or
forestall a perceived element of k and responsive is a reaction to an actual element of k. Attack features - initiation
and intent - occur simultaneously. Conversely, a defense is always initiated by the non-attack agent. Initiation then,
is singular rather than binary. Additionally, a defend relationship is always responsive since a preemptive defense is
an attack.
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5. Conclusions
The cognitive leap from limited domain, narrow intelligence to super human AGI generated a novel discourse on the
scope of future technologies (Horowitz, 2014; National Science and Technology Council, 2016). Indeed, the interest
surrounding the prospect of super human intelligence led to a subsequent influx in literature that framed AGI largely
in an imminent danger context (Mu¨ller, 2014; Bostrom, 2014; Sotala & Yampolskiy, 2014; Chalmers et al., 2016;
Amodei et al., 2016; Yudkowsky, 2008). The pretense of imminent danger led to the introduction of containment, or
the application of traditional cybersecurity technologies to thwart AGI risks (Babcock et al., 2016).
Containment research presupposes a binary world where AGI pits itself against all else to achieve a zerosum end
state (Babcock et al., 2016; Bostrom, 2002; Bostrom & Yudkowsky, 2011; Bostrom & Cirkovic, 2011). As such, the
literature fails to consider the full breadth and depth of the AGI context, while simultaneously ignoring common
tenets from which to extract further meaning. Ironically, containment proponents themselves have suggested a
standardized framework to enable comprehensive understanding and predict future events and entities (Yampolskiy
& Fox, 2012; Yampolskiy, 2014, 2016; Amodei et al., 2016). Yet, no such architecture had been brought forth.
6. Recommendations
The introduction of our cyber science AGI containment ontology addresses three critical gaps in the germinal
research by (a) identifying and arranging underlying constructs; (b) placing containment squarely within the complex
cyberworld of future AGI; and (c) establishing a level of scientific rigor previously underdeveloped within the
discipline. Moreover, our architecture empowers other researchers with central axioms that enable replicability and
shared understanding within the domain.
Future AGI containment research may build upon the single domain ontology produced in this study. Specifically,
because we have provided the means to organize the underlying constructs that engender meaning within AGI
containment, our hope is that subsequent research begins to move away from the presupposed binary nature of AGI
containment. Further, the ontology may aid future research investigating the malicious software perspective of AGI
and containment.
Certainly, there is more work to be done. Whilst an ontology may provide a foundational basis for constructing new
AGI containment knowledge, much work remains. Foremost, there is opportunity to produce theory ontologies that
describe more detailed aspects of containment. Additionally, as the field of cyber science itself evolves, there is a
need for a continuous integration between the converged knowledge domains involved in AGI containment. Lastly,
there is direct opportunity to redefine existing containment research within the scope defined through the single
domain ontology outlined in this study.
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